On Mandatory Activation of Welfare Recipients

Matz Dahlberg (), Kajsa Johansson () and Eva Mörk ()
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Kajsa Johansson: Uppsala University

No 3947, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper investigates whether mandatory activation programs for welfare recipients have effects on welfare participation, employment and disposable income. In contrast to earlier studies, we are able to capture both entry and exit effects. The empirical analysis makes use of a Swedish welfare reform in which the city districts in Stockholm gradually implemented mandatory activation programs for individuals on welfare. Overall, we find that mandatory activation of welfare recipients reduces overall welfare participation and increases employment. We also find that mandatory activation programs appear to work best for young people and for people born in non-Western countries.

Keywords: welfare reform; mandatory activation programs; welfare participation; employment; difference-in-differences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H31 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2009-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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