Peer Pressure, Incentives, and Gender: An Experimental Analysis of Motivation in the Workplace

Charles Bellemare (), Patrick Lepage () and Bruce S. Shearer ()
Additional contact information
Patrick Lepage: Université Laval
Bruce S. Shearer: Université Laval

No 3948, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We present results from a real-effort experiment, simulating actual work-place conditions, comparing the productivity of workers under fixed wages and piece rates. Workers, who were paid to enter data, were exposed to different degrees of peer pressure under both payment systems. The peer pressure was generated in the form of private information about the productivity of their peers. We have two main results. First, we find no level of peer pressure for which the productivity of either male or female workers is significantly higher than productivity without peer pressure. Second, we find that very low and very high levels of peer pressure can significantly decrease productivity (particularly for men paid fixed wages). These results are consistent with models of conformism and self-motivation.

Keywords: piece rates; fixed wages; peer effects; gender (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2009-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published - published in: Labour Economics, 2010, 17 (1), 276-283

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Related works:
Journal Article: Peer pressure, incentives, and gender: An experimental analysis of motivation in the workplace (2010)
Working Paper: Peer Pressure, Incentives, and Gender: an Experimental Analysis of Motivation in the Workplace (2009)
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