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Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace

Josse Delfgaauw, Robert Dur, Joeri Sol () and Willem Verbeke ()
Additional contact information
Joeri Sol: University of Amsterdam
Willem Verbeke: Erasmus University Rotterdam

No 4395, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We ran a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain consisting of 128 stores. In a random sample of these stores, we introduced short-term sales competitions among subsets of stores. We find that sales competitions have a large effect on sales growth, but only in stores where the store's manager and a large fraction of the employees have the same gender. Remarkably, results are alike for sales competitions with and without monetary rewards, suggesting a high symbolic value of winning a tournament. Lastly, despite the substantial variation in team size, we find no evidence for free-riding.

Keywords: competition; gender differences; field experiment; sales contests; awards (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 J16 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2009-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (55)

Published - revised version published in: Journal of Labor Economics, 2013, 31 (2) , 305-326

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Related works:
Journal Article: Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace (2012) Downloads
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