Voting with Feet: Community Choice in Social Dilemmas

Özgür Gürerk, Bernd Irlenbusch () and Bettina Rockenbach ()
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Bernd Irlenbusch: University of Cologne
Bettina Rockenbach: University of Erfurt

No 4643, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Economic and social interactions often take place in open communities but the dynamics of the community choice process and its impact on cooperation of its members are yet not well understood. We experimentally investigate community choice in social dilemmas. Participants repeatedly choose between a community with and an alternative without punishment opportunities. Within each community a social dilemma game is played. While the community with punishment grows over time and fully cooperates, the alternative becomes depopulated. We analyze the success of this "voting with feet" mechanism and find that endogenous self-selection is key while slow growth is less decisive.

Keywords: community choice; cooperation; punishment; voting with feet; social dilemmas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2009-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-pol, nep-soc and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published - completely revised version published as 'On Cooperation in Open Communities' in: Journal of Public Economics, 2014, 120, 220–230

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