Directed Search in the Housing Market

James Albrecht, Pieter Gautier and Susan Vroman

No 4671, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In this paper, we present a directed search model of the housing market. The pricing mechanism we analyze reflects the way houses are bought and sold in the United States. Our model is consistent with the observation that houses are sometimes sold above, sometimes below and sometimes at the asking price. We consider two versions of our model. In the first version, all sellers have the same reservation value. In the second version, there are two seller types, and type is private information. For both versions, we characterize the equilibrium of the game played by buyers and sellers, and we prove efficiency. Our model offers a new way to look at the housing market from a search-theoretic perspective. In addition, we contribute to the directed search literature by considering a model in which the asking price (i) entails only limited commitment and (ii) has the potential to signal seller type.

Keywords: directed search; housing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 R31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2009-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published - published in: Review of Economic Dynamics, 2016, 19, 218-231

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp4671.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Directed Search in the Housing Market (2016)
Working Paper: Directed Search in the Housing Market (2013)
Working Paper: Directed Search in the Housing Market (2010)
Working Paper: Directed Search in the Housing Market (2010)
Working Paper: Directed Search in the Housing Market (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4671

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().