Tacit Lobbying Agreements: An Experimental Study

Jens Grosser (jgrosser@fsu.edu), Ernesto Reuben and Agnieszka Tymula

No 5332, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We experimentally study the common wisdom that money buys political influence. In the game, one lobbyist has the opportunity to influence redistributive tax policies in her favor by transferring money to two competing candidates. The success of the lobbying investment depends on whether or not the candidates are willing to respond and able to collude on low-tax policies that do not harm their relative chances in the elections. In the experiment, we find that lobbying is never successful when the lobbyist and candidates interact just once. By contrast, it yields substantially lower redistribution in about 40% of societies with finitely-repeated encounters. However, lobbying investments are not always profitable, and profit-sharing between the lobbyist and candidates depends on prominent equity norms. Our experimental results shed new light on the complex process of buying political influence in everyday politics and help explain why only relatively few corporate firms do actually lobby.

Keywords: bargaining; elections; redistribution; lobbying; collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H10 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2010-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
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Published - published in: American Journal of Political Science, 2013, 57 (3), 582-597

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Working Paper: Tacit Lobbying Agreements: An Experimental Study (2010)
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