Theft and Deterrence

William Harbaugh (), Naci Mocan and Michael S. Visser ()
Additional contact information
Michael S. Visser: Sonoma State University

No 5813, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We report results from economic experiments of decisions that are best described as petty larceny, with high school and college students who can anonymously steal real money from each other. Our design allows exogenous variation in the rewards of crime, and the penalty and probability of detection. We find that the probability of stealing is increasing in the amount of money that can be stolen, and that it is decreasing in the probability of getting caught and in the penalty for getting caught. Furthermore, the impact of the certainty of getting caught is larger when the penalty is bigger, and the impact of the penalty is bigger when the probability of getting caught is larger.

Keywords: risk; arrest; juvenile; deterrence; incentives; punishment; crime; larceny (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2011-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published - published in Journal of Labor Research, 2013, 34(4), 389-407

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Related works:
Journal Article: Theft and Deterrence (2013)
Working Paper: Theft and Deterrence (2011)
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