Teams or Tournaments? A Field Experiment on Cooperation and Competition among University Students

Maria Bigoni, Margherita Fort, Mattia Nardotto () and Tommaso Reggiani ()
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Mattia Nardotto: KU Leuven

No 5844, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper assesses the effect of two stylized and antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes on students’ effort. We collect data from a field experiment where incentives are exogenously imposed, performance is monitored and individual characteristics are observed. Students are randomly assigned to a tournament scheme that fosters competition between coupled students, a cooperative scheme that promotes information sharing and collaboration between students and a control treatment in which students can neither compete, nor cooperate. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that competition induces higher effort with respect to cooperation and cooperation does not increase effort with respect to the baseline. However, this is true only for men, while women do not seem to react to non-monetary incentives.

Keywords: cooperation; incentives; field experiments; education; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A22 C93 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-edu, nep-exp, nep-hrm, nep-lab and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published - revised version published as 'Cooperation or Competition? A Field Experiment on Non-Monetary Learning Incentives' in: B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 2015, 15 (4), 1753-1792

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