Chicken or Checkin'? Rational Learning in Repeated Chess Games

Christer Gerdes, Patrik Gränsmark and Michael Rosholm

No 5862, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We examine rational learning among expert chess players and how they update their beliefs in repeated games with the same opponent. We present a model that explains how equilibrium play is affected when players change their choice of strategy when receiving additional information from each encounter. We employ a large international panel dataset with controls for risk preferences and playing skills whereby the latter accounts for ability. Although expert chess players are intelligent, productive and equipped with adequate data and specialized computer programs, we find large learning effects. Moreover, as predicted by the model, risk-averse players learn substantially faster.

Keywords: risk aversion; rational learning; beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-spo and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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