Firm-Worker Matching in Industrial Clusters

Octávio Figueiredo, Paulo Guimaraes and Douglas Woodward ()

No 6016, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In this paper we use a novel approach and a large Portuguese employer-employee panel data set to study the hypothesis that industrial agglomeration improves the quality of the firm-worker matching process. Our method makes use of recent developments in the estimation and analysis of models with high-dimensional fixed effects. Using wage regressions with controls for multiple sources of observed and unobserved heterogeneity we find little evidence that the quality of matching increases with firm’s clustering within the same industry. This result supports Freedman’s (2008) analysis using U.S. data.

Keywords: fixed-effects; matching; agglomeration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 R12 R39 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2011-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-lab, nep-lma and nep-ure
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Published - published in: Journal of Economic Geography, 2014, 14 (1), 1 - 19

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Related works:
Journal Article: Firm--worker matching in industrial clusters (2014)
Working Paper: Firm-Worker Matching in Industrial Clusters (2011)
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