Altruism, Cooperation, and Efficiency: Agricultural Production in Polygynous Households

Richard Akresh (), Joyce Chen and Charity Moore

No 6265, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Altruism among family members can, in some cases, inhibit cooperation by increasing the utility that players expect to receive in a non-cooperative equilibrium. To test this, we examine agricultural productivity in polygynous households in West Africa. We find that cooperation is greater – production is more efficient – among co-wives than among husbands and wives because co-wives are less altruistic towards each other. The results are not driven by scale effects or self-selection into polygyny. Nor can they be explained by greater propensity for cooperation among women generally or by the household head acting as an enforcement mechanism for others' cooperative agreements.

Keywords: household bargaining; non-cooperative behavior; altruism; polygyny; Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 D70 J12 O13 O55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-dev, nep-evo and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published - published in: Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2016, 64(4), 661-696

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Journal Article: Altruism, Cooperation, and Efficiency: Agricultural Production in Polygynous Households (2016)
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