Certainty and Severity of Sanctions in Classical and Behavioral Models of Deterrence: A Survey

Horst Entorf

No 6516, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This survey summarizes the classical fundamentals of modern deterrence theory, covers major theoretical and empirical findings on the impact of certainty and severity of punishment (and the interplay thereof) as well as underlying methodological problems, gives an overview of limitations and extensions motivated by recent findings of behavioral economics and discusses 'rational' deterrence strategies in subcultural societies.

Keywords: behavioral economics; economics of crime; deterrence; survey (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H0 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2012-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-iue and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published - published in: Gerben Bruinsma and David Weisburd (eds), Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Springer, 2014

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