When the Cat Is Near, the Mice Won't Play: The Effect of External Examiners in Italian Schools

Marco Bertoni, Giorgio Brunello and Lorenzo Rocco

No 6629, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We use a natural experiment to show that the presence of an external examiner in standardized school tests reduces the proportion of correct answers in monitored classes by 5.5 to 8.5% – depending on the grade and the test – with respect to classes in schools with no external monitor. We find that the effect of external monitoring in a class spills over to other classes in the same school. We argue that the negative effect of external supervision is due to reduced cheating (by students and/or teachers) rather than to distraction from having a stranger in the class.

Keywords: education; external monitoring; testing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C31 H52 I2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2012-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-lab and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published - published in: Journal of Public Economics, 2013, 104, 65-77

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Related works:
Journal Article: When the cat is near, the mice won't play: The effect of external examiners in Italian schools (2013)
Working Paper: When the Cat is Near, the Mice Won't Play: The Effect of External Examiners in Italian Schools (2013)
Working Paper: When the cat is near, the mice won't play: the effect of external examiners in Italian schools (2013)
Working Paper: When the Cat is Near, the Mice Won't Play: The Effect of External Examiners in Italian Schools (2012)
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