Conditional Cash Transfers, Political Participation, and Voting Behavior

Javier Baez, Adriana Camacho, Emily Conover and Roman Zarate ()

No 6870, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper estimates the effect of enrollment in a large scale anti-poverty program in Colombia, Familias en Acción (FA), on intent to vote, turnout and electoral choice. For identification we use discontinuities in program eligibility and variation in program enrollment across voting booths. We find that FA has a positive effect on political participation in the 2010 presidential elections by increasing the probability that program beneficiaries register to vote and cast a ballot, particularly among women. Regarding voter's choice, we find that program participants expressed a stronger preference for the official party that implemented and expanded the program. Overall, the findings show that voters respond to targeted transfers and that these transfers can foster support for incumbents, thus making the case for designing political and legislative mechanisms, as the laws recently passed by the Colombian government, that avoid successful anti-poverty schemes from being captured by political patronage.

Keywords: voting behavior; Conditional Cash Transfers; Colombia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 O10 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2012-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dev, nep-lam and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Conditional Cash Transfers, Political Participation, and Voting Behavior (2012)
Working Paper: Conditional cash transfers, political participation, and voting behavior (2012)
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