Anonymous Job Applications in Europe

Annabelle Krause-Pilatus, Ulf Rinne and Klaus Zimmermann (klaus.f.zimmermann@gmail.com)

No 7096, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Numerous empirical studies find a substantial extent of discrimination in hiring decisions. Anonymous job applications have gained attention and popularity to identify and combat this form of discrimination. To test whether their intended effects result in practice, in several European countries such as Sweden, France and the Netherlands field experiments were recently conducted. Also in Germany, a large field experiment has examined the practicability and potentials of this approach. Against the background of the recent German findings as novel evidence, this paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages of this new policy proposal.

Keywords: anonymous job applications; hiring; discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J71 J78 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2012-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

Published - published in: IZA Journal of European Labor Studies, 2012, 1:5

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