Election Fraud and Post-Election Conflict: Evidence from the Philippines

Benjamin Crost, Joseph Felter (), Hani Mansour () and Daniel Rees
Additional contact information
Joseph Felter: Stanford University

No 7469, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Previous studies have documented a positive association between election fraud and the intensity of civil conflict. It is not clear, however, whether this association is causal or due to unobserved institutional or cultural factors. This paper examines the relationship between election fraud and post-election violence in the 2007 Philippine mayoral elections. Using the density test developed by McCrary (2008), we find evidence that incumbents were able to win tightly contested elections through fraud. In addition, we show that narrow incumbent victories were associated with an increase in post-election casualties, which is consistent with the hypothesis that election fraud causes conflict. We conduct several robustness tests and find no evidence that incumbent victories increased violence for reasons unrelated to fraud.

Keywords: election fraud; conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2013-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cwa, nep-pol and nep-sea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp7469.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Election Fraud and Post-Election Conflict: Evidence from the Philippines (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7469

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().