Moonlighting Politicians: Motivation Matters!

Alessandro Fedele and Paolo Naticchioni

No 7500, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In this paper we study optimal choices of self-selection into politics and commitment once in office on the part of citizens with heterogeneous abilities and heterogeneous motivations. Politicians can moonlight, i.e., they can work in the market sector while appointed in parliament. Our theoretical framework shows that high-ability citizens may enter politics. Yet while high-ability non-motivated (market-fit) politicians are likely to shirk, high-ability motivated (public-fit) ones are more committed to parliamentary activity. We test our predictions by using a unique database of Italian parliamentarians for the period 1996-2006. We find evidence of advantageous selection of the market-fit and the public-fit politicians in that they both display a pre-election income greater than that of the Italian population. We also show that the commitment of the market-fit parliamentarians in terms of voting attendance is negatively affected by income opportunities, whilst this is not the case for the public-fit ones.

Keywords: moonlighting politicians; motivation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 J32 J45 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2013-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-hrm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published - published in: German Economic Review, 2016, 17 (2), 127 - 156

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Related works:
Journal Article: Moonlighting Politicians: Motivation Matters! (2016)
Journal Article: Moonlighting Politicians: Motivation Matters! (2016)
Working Paper: Moonlighting Politicians: Motivation Matters! (2013)
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