Giving and Sorting among Friends: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment

Christine Binzel and Dietmar Fehr

No 7516, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Among residents of an informal housing area in Cairo, we examine how dictator giving varies by the social distance between subjects – friend versus stranger – and by the anonymity of the dictator. While giving to strangers is high under anonymity, we find – consistent with Leider et al. (2009) – that (i) a decrease in social distance increases giving, (ii) giving to a stranger and to a friend is positively correlated, and (iii) more altruistic dictators increase their giving less under non-anonymity than less altruistic dictators. However, friends are not alike in their altruistic preferences, suggesting that an individual's intrinsic preferences may not necessarily be shaped by his (or her) peers. Instead, reciprocal motives seem important, indicating that social relationships may be valued differently when individuals are financially dependent on them.

Keywords: giving; reciprocity; social distance; networks; sorting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D64 L14 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2013-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-soc and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published - published in: Economics Letters, 2013, 121(2), 214-217

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Related works:
Journal Article: Giving and sorting among friends: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment (2013)
Working Paper: Giving and sorting among friends: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment (2013)
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