Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading Mechanisms in Competitive Search Markets

Benjamin Lester, Ludo Visschers and Ronald Wolthoff

No 8357, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we study how the properties of the meeting technology affect the mechanism that sellers select. In general, sellers have incentive to use mechanisms that are socially efficient. In our environment, sellers achieve this by posting an auction with a reserve price equal to their own valuation, along with a transfer that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. However, we define a novel condition on meeting technologies, which we call "invariance," and show that the transfer is equal to zero if and only if the meeting technology satisfies this condition.

Keywords: search frictions; matching function; meeting technology; competing mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published - published in: Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 155, 1-15

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https://docs.iza.org/dp8357.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets (2015)
Working Paper: Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets (2014)
Working Paper: Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading Mechanisms in Competitive Search Markets (2014)
Working Paper: Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets (2014)
Working Paper: Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets (2014)
Working Paper: Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading Mechanisms in Competitive Search Marks (2014)
Working Paper: Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading Mechanisms in Competitive Search Markets (2014)
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