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The Timing of Preference and Prejudice in Sequential Hiring Games

Glen R. Waddell () and Logan M. Lee ()
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Glen R. Waddell: University of Oregon
Logan M. Lee: Grinnell College

No 8445, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We model a hiring process in which the candidate is evaluated sequentially by two agents of the firm who each observe an independent signal of the candidate's productivity. We introduce the potential for taste-based discrimination and characterize how one agent's private valuation of the candidate influences the other agent's hiring practices. This influence is often in an offsetting direction and is partially corrective. Yet, this offsetting response can also be large enough that even a high-productivity candidate who is privately favoured by one agent, as may be the case in efforts to increase gender or racial diversity, is less likely to be hired even when the other agent has no preference over private, non-productive attributes.

Keywords: hiring; race; gender; diversity; discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 J1 J7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2014-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-hrm, nep-lab and nep-mic
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