Worker Reciprocity and the Returns to Training: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Jan Sauermann

No 9179, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Workers' reciprocal behavior is one argument used to explain why firms invest in employee human capital. We explore the relation between firm-sponsored training and reciprocity by providing evidence that workers reciprocate employer training investments by making greater effort. Using a field experiment with random assignment to a training program, we show that reciprocal workers have significantly higher performance than their non-reciprocal peers after participation in the training course. This result suggests that reciprocal workers exert greater effort in response to the firm's investment.

Keywords: field experiment; firm-sponsored training; reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 J24 M53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2015-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published - published in: Journal of Economics and Management Strategy , 2023, 32 (3), 543-557

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Related works:
Working Paper: Worker reciprocity and the returns to training: evidence from a field experiment (2020)
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