Can Reputation Discipline the Gig Economy? Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market

Alan Benson, Aaron Sojourner and Akhmed Umyarov ()
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Akhmed Umyarov: University of Minnesota

No 9501, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In two experiments, we examine the effects of employer reputation in an online labor market (Amazon Mechanical Turk) in which employers may decline to pay workers while keeping their work product. First, in an audit study of employers by a blinded worker, we find that working only for good employers yields 40% higher wages. Second, in an experiment that varied reputation, we find that good-reputation employers attract work of the same quality but at twice the rate as bad-reputation employers. This is the first clean, field evidence on the value of employer reputation. It can serve as collateral against opportunism in the absence of contract enforcement.

Keywords: online labor markets; online ratings; reputation; labor; personnel; contracts; job search; screening (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J2 J41 K12 K42 L14 L86 M55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2015-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-ict, nep-lma and nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published - published in: Management Science , 2020, 66 (5), 1802-1825

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Related works:
Journal Article: Can Reputation Discipline the Gig Economy? Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market (2020)
Working Paper: Can Reputation Discipline the Gig Economy? Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market (2018)
Working Paper: Can reputation discipline the gig economy? Experimental evidence from an online labor market (2018)
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