How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design

Alessandro Cigno

No 4, IZA Policy Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Conventional pension systems suffer from a design defect which makes them financially unsustainable, and a source of inefficiency for the economy as a whole. The paper outlines a second-best policy which includes a public pension system made up of two parallel schemes, a Bismarckian one allowing individuals to qualify for a pension by working and paying contributions in the usual way, and an unconventional one allowing them to qualify for a pension by having children, and investing time and money in their upbringing.

Keywords: labour productivity; fertility; child benefits; implicit pension taxes and subsidies; pension reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 D64 H55 J13 J14 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2009-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published - published in: CESifo Economic Studies, 2010, 56, 21-37

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/pp4.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design * (2010)
Working Paper: How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izapps:pp4

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Policy Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().