Importing a Successful System? Simulating Different Regimes of Financing Social Security for Germany

Caroline Dieckhoener () and Andreas Peichl
Additional contact information
Caroline Dieckhoener: University of Cologne
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Caroline Löffler ()

No 8, IZA Policy Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In Germany, there is an ongoing debate about how to increase the efficiency of the social security system. The aim of this paper is to simulate different financing systems for Germany with its typical Conservative welfare state regime. For our analysis, we rely on the European static multinational microsimulation model EUROMOD, which provides the opportunity to implement the financing systems of other European countries in Germany (policy swap). The introduction of a Liberal British or the Southern Greek financing system increases inequality and poverty, as well as labour supply incentives. The introduction of the Social-democratic Danish financing system decreases inequality of incomes and leads to ambiguous incentives effects. Our results suggest that there is scope for efficiency increasing reforms in Germany although we do not simulate behavioural responses.

Keywords: social security; welfare states; comparative analysis; EUROMOD (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C81 D31 H24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2009-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/pp8.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izapps:pp8

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Policy Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().