Do in-plant alliances foster employment?

Lutz Bellmann
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Lutz Bellmann: Institute for Employment Research (IAB), University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, and IZA, Germany

IZA World of Labor, 2014, No 79, 79

Abstract: In-plant alliances that tailor specific deviations from sectoral collective agreements on wages and working time are intended to hold down labor costs. These agreements enable reorganizations to respond to an imminent economic crisis or to improve competitiveness. They encourage social partners to take greater responsibility for employment issues. Both unions and works councils agree to such contracts because they see them as inevitable to avoid severe employment losses. Thus, these alliances substantially unburden public employment policy.

Keywords: in-plant alliances; decentralization of wage setting; global economic crisis; employment effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J23 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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