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Destructor Game

Esther Kessler (), Maria Ruiz-Martos () and David Skuse ()
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Esther Kessler: University College London, Behavioural & Brain Sciences Unit
David Skuse: University College London, Behavioural & Brain Sciences Unit

No 2012/11, Working Papers from Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain)

Abstract: Destructive behavior has mostly been investigated by games in which all players have the option to simultaneously destroy (burn) their partners' money. In the destructor game, players are randomly paired and assigned the roles of destructor versus passive player. The destructor player chooses to destroy or not to destroy a share of his passive partner's earnings. The passive partner cannot retaliate. In addition, a random event (nature) destroys a percentage of some passive subject's earnings. From the destructor player's view, destruction is benefit-less, costless, hidden and unilateral. Unilateral destruction diminishes with respect to bilateral destruction studies, but it does not vanish: 15% of the subjects choose to destroy. This result suggests that, at least for some, destruction is intrinsically pleasurable.

Keywords: anti-social behaviour; nastiness; money-burning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C90 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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