Equilibrium non-reciprocal Access Pricing in the Telecommunication Industry

Stefan Behringer

No 05-002, JEPS Working Papers from JEPS

Abstract: This paper looks at competition in the telecommunication industry. We determine the equilibrium pricing parameters for a duopoly situation with a particular emphasis on the role of competitively chosen non-reciprocal access prices. In the symmetric equilibrium the networks optimally choose positive access charge markups which reconciles empirical observation with the theoretical economics literature.

Keywords: Telecommunications; access pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2005-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jep:wpaper:05002

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