Entry, Access Pricing, and Welfare in the Telecommunications Industry

Stefan Behringer

No 05-003, JEPS Working Papers from JEPS

Abstract: This paper looks at the effects of entry on welfare in the telecommunication industry. The equilibrium pricing parameters for an incumbent (state) monopoly and for a duopoly situation are determined in which access charges are chosen non-reciprocally. A welfare comparison between the monopoly and duopoly equilibrium situation is undertaken and the welfare consequences of alternative access pricing regimes are investigated.

Keywords: Telecommunications; access pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2005-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-net and nep-tid
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Entry, access pricing, and welfare in the telecommunications industry (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jep:wpaper:05003

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