EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Imperfect Competition and Costly Screening in the Credit Market under Conditions of Asymmetric Information

Koji Kubo

No 15, IDE Discussion Papers from Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO)

Abstract: This article provides an analysis of how banks determine levels of information production when they are in imperfect competition and there is a condition of information asymmetry between borrowers and banks. Specifically, the study concentrates on information production activities of banks in duopoly where they simultaneously determine intensity of pre-loan screening as well as interest rates. The preliminary model of this paper illustrates that due to strategic complementarities between banks, banking competition can result in inferior equilibrium out of multiple equilibria and insufficient information production. Policymakers must take into account the possible adverse effects of competition-enhancing policies on information production activities.

Keywords: Banking; Imperfect competition; Information production; Banks; Credit; 銀行; 信用 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-com and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in IDE Discussion Paper = IDE Discussion Paper, No. 15. 2004-11-01

Downloads: (external link)
https://ir.ide.go.jp/record/38150/files/IDP000015_001.pdf First version, 2004 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jet:dpaper:dpaper15

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Publication Office, IDE 3-2-2 Wakaba, Mihama-ku, Chiba-shi, Chiba 261-8545 JAPAN
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Order

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IDE Discussion Papers from Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michitaka Imamitsu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:jet:dpaper:dpaper15