Constitutional Review and Democratic Consolidation: A Literature Review

Hazama Yasushi

No 192, IDE Discussion Papers from Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO)

Abstract: This paper reviews the literature on the prevalence of constitutional review acrossthe world, and particularly in emerging democracies, during the last two decades.Two major questions should be addressed in this regard. First, why has thejudiciary been empowered and what factors affect judicial activism? Second, doesconstitutional review ensure an effective self-enforcing function? In sum, theliterature shows that constitutional review can make democracy self-enforcing ifthere is sufficient competition among political parties or between the legislatureand the executive branch of government. In a more sophisticated case, politicalbalance within the court can also ensure the observance of court decisions.

Keywords: Judiciary; Constitutional review; Democracy; Politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Published in IDE Discussion Paper = IDE Discussion Paper, No. 192. 2009-01-01

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