Avoiding Market Dominance: Product Compatibility in Markets with Network Effects

Jiawei Chen, Ulrich Doraszelski and Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.

Economics Working Paper Archive from The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics

Abstract: As is well-recognized, market dominance is a typical outcome in markets with network effects. A firm with a larger installed base others a more attractive product which induces more consumers to buy its product which produces a yet bigger installed base advantage. Such a setting is investigated here but with the main difference that firms have the option of making their products compatible. When firms have similar installed bases, they make their products compatible in order to expand the market. Nevertheless, random forces could result in one firm having a bigger installed base in which case the larger firm may make its product incompatible. We find that strategic pricing tends to prevent the installed base differential from expanding to the point that incompatibility occurs. This pricing dynamic is able to neutralize increasing returns and avoid the emergence of market dominance.

Date: 2008-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cse, nep-mic and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ2.jhu.edu/REPEC/papers/WP537.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Avoiding market dominance: product compatibility in markets with network effects (2009)
Working Paper: Avoiding Market Dominance: Product Compatibility in Markets with Network Effects (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jhu:papers:537

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Working Paper Archive from The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics 3400 North Charles Street Baltimore, MD 21218. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Humphrey Muturi ().