Joint procurement by heterogeneous buyers

Isabel Helmrath (isabel.helmrath@uni-siegen.de), Matthias Hunold and Johannes Muthers
Additional contact information
Isabel Helmrath: University of Siegen

No 2022-14, Economics working papers from Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria

Abstract: We analyze self- and joint procurement of countries with heterogeneous demand for a good offered by a price discriminating monopolist. We find that not only countries with low but also with high demand can benefit from committing to jointly procure equal quantities at a uniform price, even if the supplier is capacity constrained. Free-riding of outside buyers as well as too much heterogeneity of insiders make the buyer group unstable. Uniform price procurement without a quantity restriction is only stable with intra-group transfers. We relate our findings to the COVID-19 vaccine procurement of the European Union.

Keywords: joint procurement; group purchase; heterogeneous buyer group; vaccine procurement; price discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D42 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2022-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-reg
Note: English
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.jku.at/papers/2022/wp2214.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jku:econwp:2022-14

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics working papers from Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by René Böheim (rene.boeheim@jku.at).