Disability Insurance Screening and Worker Outcomes

Alexander Ahammer and Analisa Packham

No 2023-01, Economics working papers from Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria

Abstract: We estimate the returns to more targeted disability insurance (DI) programs in terms of labor force participation, program spillovers, and worker health. To do so, we analyze workers after an acute workplace injury that experience differential levels of application screening. We find that when workers face stricter screening requirements, they are less likely to claim disability and are more likely to remain in the labor force. We observe no differences in any physical or mental health outcomes. Our findings imply that imposing stricter DI screening has large fiscal benefits but does not yield any detectable health costs, on the margin.

Keywords: disability insurance; retirement; health (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I18 I38 J16 J18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2023-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-lab
Note: English
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http://www.econ.jku.at/papers/2023/wp2301.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Disability Insurance Screening and Worker Outcomes (2023)
Working Paper: Disability Insurance Screening and Worker Outcomes (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jku:econwp:2023-01

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