Convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctions

Jinpeng Ma (jinpeng@camden.rutgers.edu) and Qiongling Li (ql4@rice.edu)
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Jinpeng Ma: Rutgers University, USA
Qiongling Li: Rice University, USA

The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2016, vol. 1, issue 1, 1-44

Abstract: We study the convergence of two price processes generated by two dynamic double auctions (DA) and provide conditions under which the two price processes converge to a Walrasian equilibrium in the underlying economy. When the conditions are not satisfied, the price processes may result in a bubble or crash.

Keywords: Double auction mechanisms; incremental subgradient methods; network resource allocations. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v1i1a1

DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2016.12.001

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