Do Doctors Prescribe Antibiotics Out of Fear of Malpractice?

Sebastian Panthöfer

2016 Papers from Job Market Papers

Abstract: This paper investigates whether doctors prescribe antibiotics to protect themselves against potential malpractice claims. Using data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey on more than half a million outpatient visits between 1993 and 2011, I find that doctors are 6% less likely to prescribe antibiotics after the introduction of a cap on noneconomic damages. Over 140 million discharge records from the Nationwide Inpatient Sample do not reveal a corresponding change in hospital stays for conditions that can potentially be avoided through antibiotic use in the outpatient setting. These findings, as well as a stylized model of antibiotic prescribing under the threat of malpractice, suggest that liability-reducing tort reforms can decrease the amount of antibiotics that are inappropriately prescribed for defensive reasons.

JEL-codes: I11 I18 K13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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