Echo Chambers: Voter-to-Voter Communication and Political Competition

Monica Anna Giovanniello

2017 Papers from Job Market Papers

Abstract: I investigate, in a model of informative campaign advertising, how the ability of voters to strategically communicate with each other shapes the advertising strategies of two competing parties. Two main results are put forward. First, information does not travel among voters biased toward different parties even if they are ideologically close â âecho chambersâ arise endogenously. Second, whenever the probability of interaction among like-minded voters is low (low homophily), parties tailor their advertising on their opponentâs supporters rather than on swing or core states voters.

JEL-codes: D72 D83 M37 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-11-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic, nep-mkt and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Echo Chambers: Voter-to-Voter Communication and Political Competition (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmp:jm2017:pgi364

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