Response Time under Monetary Incentives: the Ultimatum Game

Pablo Brañas-Garza, Ana Leon-Mejia and Luis Miller
Additional contact information
Ana Leon-Mejia: IESA-CSIC

No 2007-070, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: This paper studies the response times of experimental subjects playing the Ultimatum game in a laboratory setting using monetary incentives. We find that proposals are not significantly correlated with response time, whereas responders' behavior is positively and significantly correlated. Hence, consistent with Rubisntein (forthcoming) we find that response times may capture relevant cognitive processes. However, the use of monetary incentives causes a reversal of his findings. These results have implications for the information about cognitive mechanisms that can be obtained from response times.

Keywords: Monetary incentives; Ultimatum game; response time (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-09-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic risk and response time across games (2017)
Working Paper: Interactive and Moral Reasoning: A Comparative Study of Response Times (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-070

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