The Hidden Costs of Control: An Unsuccessful Replication Study

Matteo Ploner and Anthony Ziegelmeyer

No 2007-074, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: This note reports a replication study of Falk and Kosfeld’s (2006) medium control treatment. In the experimental game, an agent has an endowment of 120 experimental currency units and decides how much to transfer to a principal. For every unit that the agent gives up, the principal receives two units. Before the agent decides how much to transfer voluntarily, the principal decides whether or not to control the agent by imposing a compulsory transfer of 10 units. Like the original study, we observe that control entails hidden costs. Unlike the original study, we do not observe that the hidden costs of control outweigh the beneï¬ ts and we observe that most of the principals decide to control the agent.

Keywords: Control; Experimental Economics; Incentives; Intrinsic Motivation; Trust. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-10-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-soc
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://oweb.b67.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2007/wp_2007_074.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-074

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Markus Pasche ().