Three Very Simple Games and What It Takes to Solve Them

Ondrej Rydval, Andreas Ortmann and Michal Ostatnicky
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Michal Ostatnicky: CERGE-EI, Charles University Prague and Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic

No 2007-092, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: We study the nature of dominance violations in three minimalist dominance-solvable guessing games, featuring two or three players choosing among two or three strategies. We examine how subjects' reported reasoning translates into their choices and beliefs about others' choices, and how reasoning and choices relate to their measured cognitive and personality characteristics. Only about a third of our subjects reason in accord with dominance; they always make dominant choices and almost always expect others to do so. By contrast, around 60% of subjects describe reasoning processes inconsistent with dominance, yet a quarter of them actually make dominant choices and a fifth of them expect others to do so. Dominance violations seem to arise mainly due to subjects misrepresenting the strategic nature of the guessing games. Reasoning errors are more likely for subjects with lower ability to maintain and allocate attention, as measured by working memory, and for subjects with weaker intrinsic motivation and premeditation attitudes.

Keywords: cognition; bounded rationality; beliefs; guessing games; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-11-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Three very simple games and what it takes to solve them (2009)
Working Paper: Three Very Simple Games and What It Takes to Solve Them (2009)
Working Paper: Three Very Simple Games and What It Takes to Solve Them (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-092

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