Planning ahead: eliciting intentions and beliefs in a public goods game

Luis G. Gonzalez and Maria Levati
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Luis G. Gonzalez: Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany

No 2007-104, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: In a two-person ï¬ nitely repeated public goods experiment, we use intentions data to interpret individual behavior. Based on a random-utility model speciï¬ cation, we develop a relationship between a player's beliefs about others' behavior and his contributions' plans, and use this relationship to identify the player's most likely preference "type". Our estimation analysis indicates that players are heterogeneous in their preferences also at the intentional level. Moreover, our data show that deviations from intended actions are positively related to changes in beliefs, thereby suggesting that people are able to plan.

Keywords: Public goods games; Experiments; Latent-class logit; Conditional cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-12-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-dcm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pbe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-104

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