Unique Bid Auction Games

Amnon Rapoport, Hironori Otsubo, Bora Kim () and William E. Stein ()
Additional contact information
Bora Kim: Department of Management and Organizations, Eller College of Management, University of Arizona
William E. Stein: Department of Information and Operations Management, Mays Business School, Texas A&M University

No 2009-005, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: Two auction mechanisms are studied in which players compete with one another for an exogenously determined prize by independently submitting integer bids in some discrete and commonly known strategy space specified by the auctioneer. In the unique lowest (highest) bid auction game, the winner of the prize is the player who submits the lowest (highest) bid provided that this bid is unique, i.e., unmatched by other bids. Assuming a commonly known finite population of players, a non-negative cost of entry, and an option to stay out of the auction if the entry cost is deemed too high, we propose an algorithm for computing symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium solutions to the two variants of the auction game, illustrate them, and examine their properties.

Keywords: Unique bid auction games; Equilibrium analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://oweb.b67.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2009/wp_2009_005.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2009-005

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Markus Pasche ().