Internal and external political competition

David Hugh-Jones

No 2009-067, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: All rulers face political competition, both from rivals within their state, and from other states to which their subjects may exit. In a simple model, both kinds of competition are substitutes. Internal competition (democracy) bene?ts citizens by allowing them to replace rent-seeking rulers. But it also weakens these rulers' incentives to invest. External competition forces rent-seeking rulers to invest so as to prevent migration. As a result, citizens are less willing to ?ght for democracy, and rulers are less eager to oppose it, when external competition is high. In a panel of countries, there are fewer changes towards democracy when states have low GDP relative to their neighbours.

Keywords: political competition; dictatorship; democracy; transitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cse, nep-mic and nep-pol
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