On reciprocal Behavior in Prisoner Dilemma game

Ahmed Doghmi () and Miloudi Kobiyh ()
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Miloudi Kobiyh: Center for Research in Economics and Management, University of Caen, France

No 2009-072, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce the concept of payoff distortion in the standard prisoner's dilemma game when strategies are driven by psychological behaviors. This concept enables to take account each player's assessment of the other player's behavior and the asymmetry of information. We determine the conditions which allow that mutual cooperation constitutes the equilibrium. we particularly focus on the reciprocity in case of complete and incomplete information about the payoffi distortion. We show that mutual cooperation is a Nash equilibrium with complete information and is a Bayesian equilibrium when each player believes that his opponent behaves with "large" reciprocity in incomplete information environment.

Keywords: Reciprocity; Behavior; Cooperation; prisoner's dilemma game. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2009-072

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