Vertically Related Markets of Collective Licensing of Differentiated Copyrights with Indirect Network Effects
Tim Paul Thomes ()
Additional contact information
Tim Paul Thomes: School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich Schiller University Jena
No 2010-056, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
Abstract:
This paper presents a theory of vertically interrelated markets of identical fixed size under implementation of positive indirect network effects. By introducing two Salop circles, a two-sided market model is provided, where intermediaries of differentiated copyrights for intellectual property, like performing rights organizations or publishers, compete as oligopsonists for owners of the intellectual property and as oligopolists for the users of their blanket licenses. We demonstrate, that an increase in competition benefits either license users or copyright owners or harms both groups. Moreover, if license users gain from an increased market entry, the owners of the intellectual property have to incur losses and vice versa.
Keywords: Vertical restraints; Indirect network effects; Copyright enforcement; Performing rights organizations; Music industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L44 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-08-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cul, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://oweb.b67.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2010/wp_2010_056.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-056
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Markus Pasche ().