Group Reciprocity

David Hugh-Jones () and Martin Leroch
Additional contact information
David Hugh-Jones: Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena

No 2010-066, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: People exhibit group reciprocity when they retaliate, not against the person who harmed them, but against somebody else in that person's group. Group reciprocity may be a key motivation behind intergroup conflict. We investigated group reciprocity in a laboratory experiment. After a group identity manipulation, subjects played a Prisoner's Dilemma with others from different groups. Subjects then allocated money between themselves and others, learning the group of the others. Subjects who knew that their partner in the Prisoner's Dilemma had defected became relatively less generous to people from the partner's group, compared to a third group. We use our experiment to develop hypotheses about group reciprocity and its correlates.

Keywords: reciprocity; groups; conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://oweb.b67.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2010/wp_2010_066.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-066

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Markus Pasche ().