The emergence of norms from conflicts over just distributions

Luis Miller, Heiko Rauhut () and Fabian Winter
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Heiko Rauhut: ETH Zurich, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology

No 2011-018, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: Why is it that well-intentioned actions can create persistent conflicts? While norms are widely regarded as a source for cooperation, this article proposes a novel theory in which the emergence of norms can be understood as a bargaining process in which normative conflicts explain the finally emerging norm. The theory is tested with a dynamical experiment on conflicts over the consideration of equality, effort or efficiency for the distribution of joint earnings. Normative conflict is measured by the number of rejected offers in a recursive bargaining game. The emerging normative system is analyzed by feedback cycles between micro- and macro-level. It is demonstrated that more normative cues cause more normative conflict. Further, under the structural conditions of either simple or complex situations, the convergence towards a simple and widely shared norm is likely. In contrast, in moderately complex situations, convergence is unlikely and several equally reasonable norms co-exist. The findings are discussed with respect to the integration of sociological conflict theory with the bargaining concept in economic theory.

Keywords: social norms; normative conflict; bargaining; cooperation; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-04-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hpe, nep-ltv and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-018

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