See No Evil: Information Chains and Reciprocity in Teams

Eva Maria Berger Steiger and Ro'i Zultan

No 2011-040, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: Transparency in teams can induce cooperation. We study contribution decisions by agents when previous decisions can be observed. We find that an information chain, in which each agent directly observes only the decision of her immediate predecessor, is at least as effective as a fully-transparent protocol in inducing cooperation under increasing returns to scale. In a comparable social dilemma, the information chain leads to high cooperation both when compared to a non-transparent protocol for early movers, and when compared to a fully-transparent protocol for late movers. we conclude that information chains facilitate cooperation by balancing positive and negative reciprocity.

Keywords: team production; public goods; incentives; externality; information; transparency; conditional cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D21 J31 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-09-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hrm, nep-mic and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: See No Evil: Information Chains and Reciprocity in Teams (2011)
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