Do not Trash the Incentive! Monetary incentives and waste sorting

Alessandro Bucciol, Natalia Montinari () and Marco Piovesan

No 2011-058, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: This paper examines whether monetary incentives are an effective tool for increasing domestic waste sorting. We exploit the exogenous variation in the waste management policies experienced during the years 1999-2008 by the 95 municipalities in the district of Treviso (Italy). We estimate with a panel analysis that pay-as-you-throw (PAYT) incentive schemes increase by 12.3% the sorted-total waste ratio. This increase reflects a change in the behavior of households, who keep unaltered the production of total waste but sort it to a larger extent. Our data show that household behavior is also influenced by the policies of adjacent municipalities.

Keywords: Incentives; environment; waste management; PAYT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D78 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-res
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Do Not Trash the Incentive! Monetary Incentives and Waste Sorting (2015)
Working Paper: Do Not Trash the Incentive! Monetary Incentives and Waste Sorting (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-058

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