Threshold public good games and impulse balance theory

Federica Alberti, Edward Cartwright and Anna Stepanova
Additional contact information
Anna Stepanova: School of Economics, University of Kent, Canterbury
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Anna Cartwright

No 2011-062, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: We propose and develop a model of behavior in threshold public good games. The model draws on learning direction theory and impulse balance theory. We find good support for the model and demonstrate that it can explain the success rates observed in threshold public good experiments. The model is applied in a variety of dierent settings : we compare games with a full refund to those with no refund, consider changes in relative endowment, and consider changes in the step return and net reward.

Keywords: Public good; threshold; learning direction theory; impulse balance theory; counterfactual thinking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-062

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