Full agreement and the provision of threshold public goods

Federica Alberti and Edward Cartwright

No 2011-063, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: We report threshold public good experiments in which group members not only need to be individually willing to contribute enough to provide the public good but also have to agree with each other on what every group members should contribute. We find strong support to the hypothesis that full agreement increases successful provision, although it takes a few repetitions before group members can successfully coordinate. This is consistent with our theoretical results that full agreement works because it increases criticality of each individual decision. The existence of a focal point makes it possible for the group members to successfully coordinate.

Keywords: Public good; threshold; full agreement; focal point; experiment; coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://oweb.b67.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2011/wp_2011_063.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Full agreement and the provision of threshold public goods (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-063

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Markus Pasche ().